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LAY ABSTRACT
The number of patients surviving severe brain injury is 
increasing; however, many are left in a prolonged disord­
er of consciousness. With appropriate treatment, these 
patients can survive for years. Unless a living will exists; the 
doctors can authorize withdrawal of artificial nutrition 
and hydration for these patients, based on best inter­
ests. There is an urge to revise the current terminology 
used in prolonged disorders of consciousness (vegetative 
state and minimally conscious state) to better reflect our 
understanding of these conditions, which will, in turn, 
ease the challenges faced when making a decision about 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration of these 
patients. A decision­making pathway based on a new 
taxonomy is proposed. The importance of reassessment 
is reinforced to clarify diagnosis and help with prognos­
is. Adopting a new classification for prolonged disorders 
of consciousness would clarify how we think about these 
patients.
The number of patients surviving severe brain injury 
is increasing; however, many are left in a prolonged 
disorder of consciousness. With appropriate tre­
atment, patients with prolonged disorders of con­
sciousness can survive for years. Unless an advance 
directive exists, the treating clinicians can authorize 
withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydra­
tion for these patients, based on best interests. The 
classic terminology used in prolonged disorders of 
consciousness ranges from coma, vegetative state 
to minimally conscious state. However, a new group 
of patients with covert cognition has been identified 
in the last decade, making it necessary to revise the 
current taxonomy to better reflect our understand­
ing of these conditions. With the introduction of a 
less ambiguous terminology, the challenges when it 
comes to withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition 
and hydration of these patients may ease. A decision­ 
making pathway for withdrawal of clinically assisted 
nutrition and hydration for patients with prolonged 
disorders of consciousness, based on a new tax­
onomy is proposed. These decisions should be based 
primarily on best interests. The adoption of a new 
classification for impairments of consciousness 
would clarify and improve how we think about these 
patients. Moreover, the development of accurate 
prognostic predictors would be a major step in the 
decision­making process, as it would influence the 
beneficent pathway towards the best clinical out­
come.
Key words: clinically assisted nutrition and hydration; consci­
ousness; covert cognition; decision­making; minimally cons­
cious state; prolonged disorders of consciousness; vegetative 
state.
Accepted Apr 8, 2021; Epub ahead of print Apr 19, 2021
J Rehabil Med 2021; 53: jrm00193
Correspondence address: Liliana da Conceição Teixeira, School of 
Health Sciences, Polytechnic of Leiria, Portugal. E­mail: liliana.teix­
eira@ipleiria.pt
It is commonly recognized that, with advances in acute medicine and consequent developments in the man­
agement of patients with severe brain injury, there has 
been significant increase in survival rates. Many patients, 
however, are left in severely disabled conditions, where 
there may be an intact brainstem and metabolic function, 
but no evidence of awareness of self or environment 
(1). This population fit within the so-called category of 
prolonged disorders of consciousness (PDOC). PDOC 
can be used to describe a spectrum of disorders in which 
consciousness is altered in a transient or permanent 
way (2). It ranges in the form of a hierarchy, including 
coma, vegetative state (VS) and minimally conscious 
state (MCS). Furthermore, it describes any disorder of 
consciousness that has continued for at least 4 weeks 
following sudden-onset brain injury (3). 
Consciousness is a biological process in which 
human beings not only are conscious of the passing 
events of life (awareness of the environment), but 
also are richly aware of themselves as participants in 
life (awareness of self) (4). Furthermore, there are 2 
components of consciousness: arousal and awareness. 
Arousal is a state in which an individual’s eyes are 
open, and awareness can be used to described that we 
are conscious of our surroundings, body’s movement, 
our memories and emotions (5). PDOC affect both 
arousal level and awareness (6).
The Royal College of Physicians’ national clinical 
guidelines for PDOC (2020) defined VS as a para­
doxical state of wakefulness without demonstrated 
awareness in which there is preserved capacity for 
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by sleep-wake cycles and a range of reflexive and 
spontaneous behaviours (3). There is no evidence of 
awareness of themselves, others or their environment. 
The term MCS was first introduced in 2002. This 
designation enriched the clinical scene, by giving a 
name to a cohort of patients who were previously 
grouped within the VS and whose diagnosis remains 
confused with it (7). Giacino and colleagues quantified 
MCS as limited and inconsistent, but clear, evidence 
of awareness of themselves or their environment (8). 
Their responses are inconsistent, but reproducible, and 
above the level of reflexive or spontaneous behaviour, 
which is indicative of some degree of interaction with 
the environment (3). Some people with brain damage 
are blind, or deaf, or unable to move certain parts of their 
bodies, therefore, what a minimally conscious person 
can do to demonstrate that they are aware of themselves 
and their environment will vary. There will be times 
when they can follow simple commands and times when 
they cannot; their consciousness is likely to fluctuate. 
MCS was later subcategorized based on the complexity 
of the patients’ behaviours (9). The term MCS minus 
is used to describe patients with low­level behavioural 
responses (i.e. patients who can visual pursuit, localize 
noxious stimulation or contingent behaviours, such as 
appropriate smiling or crying to emotional stimuli) and 
MCS plus is used to describe patients with high-level 
behavioural responses (i.e. patients who can follow com­
mands, have intelligible verbalizations or non­functional 
communication). It is important to retain, that, although 
some MCS patients may follow commands to a certain 
degree, functional communication is not possible.
This is the classical and generally accepted termin-
ology used to describe PDOC. Whilst the introduction in 
2002 of the term MCS was an immense progress to help 
clinicians to classify a cohort of patients whose criteria 
did not fit within the VS category; it brought numerous 
problems. This definition can be considered problematic, 
as it may carry ambiguity when it comes to the presence 
of consciousness. Under the current diagnostic criteria, 
the question arises whether a minimally conscious 
person is really conscious? Within this classic taxonomy, 
MCS encompasses a wide and heterogenous set of states 
that range from unconscious patients with residual islets 
of cortical activity that translates into overt behaviour, 
to conscious, but cognitively impaired, patients, who 
may be self­conscious and able to respond to simple 
commands, but unable to functionally communicate 
due to other executive deficits (10). Several authors 
have reported a need to revise the current taxonomy; 
as it was devised before the development of tech­
niques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) (10, 11). 
The new terminology adopted should do justice to the 
patient’s overt and covert consciousness, regardless of 
whether they demonstrate it behaviourally. It should, 
therefore, model the relationships between the various 
behavioural, cognitive and neural capacities of patients 
(11). Decisions about withdrawal of clinically assisted 
nutrition and hydration (CANH) should always be made 
with extreme caution, not only for patients in a MCS, 
due to its wide spectrum of states, but also for patients 
in a VS. There is overwhelming evidence that, when 
patients in a VS are assessed using fMRI, a significant 
proportion are indeed conscious (12–14). This may be 
due to the fact that, in some of these patients, motor func­
tion is so impaired that behavioural assessments may 
not reveal awareness, regardless of how thoroughly and 
carefully they are conducted (13). This covert cognition 
has recently been named “cognitive motor dissocia­
tion”. Patients with cognitive motor dissociation, can 
present behaviourally like VS or low MCS patients, but 
demonstrate fMRI or electrophysiological evidence of 
command following (15, 16).
DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS
Despite the terminology used, patients with PDOC 
continue to pose problems in terms of their diagnosis, 
treatment and prognosis (17). Differentiating between 
the different states of consciousness is often difficult, 
due to the nature of the changes in both central and pe­
ripheral nervous systems (18). Moreover, purposeful, 
spontaneous and reflexive behaviours can be difficult 
to differentiate, and subtle signs of consciousness may 
be missed. This is due, not only to the complexity of 
this condition, but also to the biological and psycho­
logical limitation of what a person can know about 
the quantity and quality of another person’s awareness 
(19). Nevertheless, establishing a proper diagnosis is of 
high clinical relevance, as the outcome of a conscious 
vs unconscious patient is different, not only in terms 
of care, but also in terms of pharmacological and non­
pharmacological interventions, as well as decisions to 
withdraw CANH. 
Serial assessments, already suggested to improve 
diag nostic accuracy, may also aid with prognosis (20). In 
addition, age, aetiology and time post­injury have proved 
to be the most accurate prognostic indicators for patients 
with PDOC (21, 22). Furthermore, the prognostic uncer­
tainty only aggravates the challenges clinicians face when 
considering withdrawal of CANH (23). The prognosis 
for recovery is more homogeneous for VS than for other 
PDOC, though age and level of awareness may have some 
predictive value (3). Although very few published papers 
have addressed the long­term prognosis for recovery in 
patients with PDOC, it is commonly accepted that the 
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The majority of patients who move out of PDOC do so 
in the first year after the onset of their illness or injury. 
Furthermore, after 3 months for an anoxic aetiology and 
12 months for a traumatic aetiology of the PDOC, it is 
known that the functional outcome will not be very dif­
ferent from the functional level to date (24). While it is not 
known how many patients will emerge after 12 months 
after injury, most patients in PDOC for this length of time 
remain severely or totally disabled (22, 25). Recently, a 
study was conducted with the hopes of using behavioural 
observations to detect the potential for later emergence 
from VS (19). The results suggest that the patients who 
emerged from VS, exhibited a significantly higher number 
of different behaviours at rest, than those who remained in 
VS. This should be further explored, as the type of cortical 
and subcortical behaviours could carry some weight in 
predicting prognosis for this population. 
Some patients may fail to fully recover awareness and, 
if provided with life­sustaining treatment and adequate 
medical and nursing care, remain in PDOC for the rest 
of their lives (26). The critical question is no longer 
whether the person may emerge, but whether they will 
recover a quality of life that they themselves would 
value. Furthermore, awareness or even a functional 
status improvement, should not necessarily be associa­
ted with an improvement in quality of life, unless there 
is a clear understanding of what “quality of life” means 
to that person (3).
Finding an accurate prognosis predictor, as well 
as using a terminology that best defines the reality of 
these patients, i.e. a terminology that encompasses 
covert cognition, would be a significant development, 
since it would help to optimize efficient care manage­
ment of this population group, would aid in relieving 
patients’ distress, as well as supporting families with 
their concerns and anxieties, some of them related to 
withdrawing CANH.
TAXONOMY REFORM
Currently, the assessment of PDOC is clinical, therefore 
it is based on the patients’ behavioural responses. In 
order to accommodate patients with covert cognition, 
Naccache proposed a new terminology including func­
tional brain imaging as a source of evidence and based 
on the type of behavioural responses demonstrated by 
the patients, introducing the term cortically mediated 
state (CMS) (10). According to Naccache, this proposal 
is not to be considered definitive, but rather a sketch of 
what the next classification should be (10). His new 
proposal of classification of impairments of conscious­
ness ranges from state 1a – comatose state (source of 
evidence: behaviour and functional brain imaging); state 
1b – comatose state (source of evidence: behaviour); 
state 2a – VS (source of evidence: behaviour and func­
tional brain imaging); state 2b – VS (source of evi­
dence: behaviour); state 3a – CMS (source of evidence: 
functional brain imaging); state 3b – CMS (source of 
evidence: behaviour); state 4a – conscious state (source 
of evidence: functional brain imaging); and finally state 
4b – conscious state (source of evidence: behaviour). 
In state 3a, the patients exhibit cortically mediat ed 
behaviours on functional brain imaging, but clini­
cally present as VS, with no external evidence of 
consciousness. In state 3b, the patient presents signs 
of consciousness by exhibiting cortically mediated 
behaviours. This new classification fills a significant 
gap in the field; patients who were assessed as being 
clinically in VS, but demonstrated signs of con­
sciousness when using functional brain imaging, had 
no diagnostic category within the current taxonomy; 
hence their diagnosis continued to be VS. This poses 
many problems and misunderstandings for some rela­
tives and team members. Moreover, patients that can 
only localize stimuli, who are currently diagnosed as 
MCS minus, would, according to this new taxonomy, 
be classified as CMS (3b – source of evidence: be­
haviour). Remov ing the name “consciousness” from 
the diagnosis of these groups of patients, would help 
clarify some of the difficulties that relatives sometimes 
have in comprehending the MCS minus states, most of 
them leading to a false expectancy of recovery. Ethical 
and treatment­decision problems that rise from these 
difficulties would potentially be addressed more easily.
However, it is questioned if the state 4a, proposed 
by Naccache should still be classified as MCS and 
4b as emergence from MCS. As defining it simply 
as “conscious states” may raise some diagnostic 
issues, families may not understand that, although it 
is called a “conscious state”, it is still an impairment 
of consciousness, and ethical problems may also rise 
when it comes to decision-making about CANH. It is 
also questioned whether state 4a needs better defini­
tion criteria as to the types of behaviours that can be 
exhibited; and possibly the inclusion of a different 
sublevel within level 4. Additional studies are required 
to refine and define these PDOC categories in order to 
optimize care management and to support families with 
decisions related to withdrawal of CANH.
CHALLENGES OF WITHDRAWING 
CLINICALLY ASSISTED NUTRITION AND 
HYDRATION
CANH is considered one of the 12 categories of reha­
bilitation interventions for individuals with PDOC 
(27). The benefit of CANH is to maintain wellbeing 
through provision of nutrition and hydration, preserva­
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tion of life, and future improvement in quality of life. 
Its burdens include ongoing pain or discomfort that the 
person might experience, frequent replacing of feeding 
tubes, aspiration, vomiting and hypersensitivity, to 
name a few (3). Patients with PDOC lack capacity for 
decision­making and cannot provide consent for a life­
ending intervention, such as discontinuing nutrition and 
hydration, or even to agree to the intervention in the 
first place (28); unless a living will, or any other form 
of advance directive exists, namely an Advance Direc­
tive Refusing Treatment (ADRT) (29). These patients 
can survive for years with appropriate treatment. With 
so many people under these circumstances receiving 
CANH, which prolongs their life, the questions arise 
as to when it is potentially not in their best interests, 
and is their suffering being prolonged by giving them 
futile treatment? There is no consensus regarding the 
definition of futile treatment; however it is generally 
accepted that it can be defined as one that serves no 
purposes or is ineffective. There are 3 conceptions 
of futility that are commonly evoked: physiological, 
quantitative and qualitative (30). Quantitative futility 
is when the proposed intervention is highly unlikely 
to achieve the desired outcome. Although CANH in 
PDOC is not considered quantitatively or physiolo­
gically futile, as it serves its purposes of feeding and 
hydrating the person; it can be considered futile from 
a quality of life point of view. Qualitative futility is a 
situation in which, even if the intervention achieves its 
intended outcome, the outcome or quality of life attain­
ed is inherently undesirable (30). Qualitative futility 
requires judgment about one’s quality of life, which are 
always hard to make in most patients, but even more for 
PDOC. CANH has enduring side-effects, which must 
always be outweighed by the promised benefits. If the 
benefits of CANH do not accrue, the side-effects are 
not justified, and therefore CANH can be considered 
futile for that patient. In other cases, continuing treat-
ment could harm patients with PDOC by defeating 
their interests in not living in these states (1) as CANH 
is prolonging a life that the person, prior to being in a 
PDOC, may have not considered worth living. 
Withdrawing CANH from a patient in a VS was given 
court approval for the first time, in England, in 1993 
and in 2015 for a patient in MCS (31, 32). In 2018, the 
requirement to obtain legal sanction for every decision 
to withdraw CANH from people in PDOC was removed 
(33). Withdrawal of CANH can be authorized by the 
treating clinicians, after consulting the relevant people 
involved and based on the patient’s best interests, unless 
an ADRT exists. Although, the family does not make the 
ultimate decision and do not carry any responsibility for 
it, their views are sought by the clinical team, to ascertain 
what the patient would have wanted. 
For patients with no awareness of self or environ ment, 
the predominant assumption is that life­prolonging 
treatment is not in their best interests (34). However, 
the decision to withdraw CANH from persons with 
some evidence of consciousness, presents unique 
ethical challenges for clinicians and relatives, because 
it leads to the death of a vulnerable person who is not 
able to express their own opinion (35). Unlike a person 
who is completely unaware of their circumstances, a 
person with some degree of consciousness, can poten­
tially have some awareness of their condition and ex­
perience distress as a consequence (36). In these cases, 
an awareness improvement does not mean they are in a 
better condition; it can mean being in a worse situation 
with regards to psychological well­being as they may 
be more aware of their situation and, consequently, 
their limitations (3). Dealing with these patients is often 
an enduring task for healthcare professionals. It is not 
especially relevant if CANH is considered a medical 
intervention or, on the other hand, only basic support. 
What is relevant is to determine whether, at least in 
some circumstances, it is a disproportionate treatment 
for which the burdens outweigh the benefits. 
Patients’ wishes are paramount, namely when a 
written ADRT does exist. Indeed, many patients have 
a living will precisely for this purpose. Also, having 
a legal representative with durable power of attorney 
allows someone close to the patient to respect his/her 
wishes in accordance with a substituted judgement 
framework. However, most frequently these patients 
are in no condition to make such choices per se, and 
have no advance directive, and therefore healthcare 
professionals must decide in accordance with accepted 
ethical standards. In extreme circumstances it would be 
advisable to ask for a court decision, but, nevertheless, 
most professionals, as well as patients’ families, would 
prefer a more consensual approach, which leaves aside 
utilitarian considerations of distributive justice, but is 
grounded in a strict deontological approach based on 
the moral duties of healthcare professionals. 
The best interests of any patient in PDOC are related 
to his/her prognosis and to avoid unnecessary harm. 
Therefore, the development of an accurate prognosis 
predictor would be a major step towards this goal. 
Indeed, doing the best for the patient means reach­
ing a delicate balance between the existent clinical 
evidence (evidence­based medicine), agreed medical 
best practice (leges artis) and the expected outcomes. 
Usually, this complex mix is accomplished and even 
optimized by professional know­how and expertise, 
but, in extreme circumstances, such as in patients 
demonstrating some, even if minimal awareness, it 
would be helpful if the decision­making process was 
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of proportionality, meaning that CANH should be 
proportionate to the goal pursued.
DECISION-MAKING PATHWAY
Physicians have an ethical duty to maximize benefits 
(beneficence) and to avoid doing harm. This is also an 
ethical imperative shared by all healthcare profession­
als. The question is what beneficence means in this 
context? Although the ethics of resource allocation 
in healthcare must always be considered, it would be 
beneficial to have a decision-making pathway that is 
based primarily on the best interests of the patients, to 
guide clinicians through this process. Repeated clinical 
assessment overtime is required, not only for clinical 
monitoring and treatment planning, but also for best 
interests decision-making. Reassessment of PDOC 
should occur at regular intervals (6 and 12 months, 
and yearly thereafter) to detect any changes in patients’ 
responsiveness (3). Without it, the transition through 
the PDOC continuum may go unnoticed.
Despite the assessor’s experience allied with the 
best assessment scales that could be used to achieve an 
accurate diagnosis, there is still this group of patients 
who are unable to respond behaviourally, but are able 
to respond mentally to neuroimaging or electrophysio­
logical paradigms (37). Following a decision-making 
pathway that uses less ambiguous terminology, 
which is similarly closer to the reality of the patients’ 
responses and includes covert cognition, would also be 
beneficial when making decisions to withdraw CANH. 
With this in mind, and following Naccache’s proposal, 
the authors designed a decision­making pathway, with 
the hopes of describing the steps that need to be taken 
in order to reach a decision about withdrawal of nutri­
tion and hydration in patients with PDOC.
Replacing the term MCS minus by CMS (or states 3a 
and 3b), as proposed by Naccache,would improve the 
way we think about patients with cortically mediated 
behaviours, but not necessarily conscious, and therefore 
the way we take care of them; as achieving an accurate 
diagnosis is critical to direct appropriate rehabilitation 
and/or decisions about withdrawal of treatment. If a 
new taxonomy, which is better representative of the 
patient’s reality and our understanding of it is adopted, 
which encompasses both behavioural and imaging 
techniques, then for levels 2a to 3b the predominant 
assumption should be that life­prolonging treatment 
is not in their best interests. The patients’ falling into 
category 4a, which from our point of view, need better 
definition criteria, should be analysed on an individual 
basis. According to Naccache, patients in this category 
are presumed to have the ability for only a limited range 
of elementary conscious contents. Hence, if considered 
by the clinicians and relatives to be in the patient’s best 
interests, withdrawal of CANH can be considered. For 
these patients the weight of a reliable prognostic pre­
dictor is paramount. Having some security about their 
prognosis, will help with the process. For other cases 
that fall within the category 4a, where the decisions on 
best interest remains finely balanced, a court application 
should be made. Nevertheless, the central feature is that 
the team must always establish what is in the patient’s 
best interest. Patients in category 4b, which, according 
to this terminology, are emerging from MCS, have 
greater degrees of cognitive complexity and are able to 
functionally communicate, are cases that normally have 
a better prognosis. Therefore, withdrawal of CANH 
should not be considered by the team. Fig. 1 illustrates 
Fig. 1. Diagram to guide clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) 
decision­making in patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness 
(PDOC). ADRT: Advance Directive Refusing Treatment.
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a decision­making pathway that will guide clinicians 
through the process of withdrawing CANH in PDOC.
CONCLUSION
The decision-making process in patients in PDOC, 
namely the withdrawal of CANH, can be ethically 
and legally questionable in the absence of an ADRT. 
Therefore, clinicians must be prepared for legal dis­
pute regarding withholding or withdrawing of life­ 
sustaining treatments. The courts might be the last gua­
rantee that the best interests of the patients are always 
considered when a person is unable to make choices 
for themselves. In these cases, the equation between 
the expected quality of life (and not merely extending 
life) vs the global suffering of the patient seems to be 
paramount. The decisions regarding withdrawal of 
CANH for patients with PDOC should be guided by 
reliable information on their condition and how the 
patient wanted to be treated and/or their beliefs about 
living in such a condition. As best management of 
PDOC requires a correct diagnosis and prognosis, a 
new taxonomy is needed. 
This decision-making pathway does not try to break 
any grounds on what is already done by clinicians. 
However, it is a novelty as it includes a new taxonomy 
reform proposed by Naccache to support complex 
decision­making through better representation of the 
state of the person. Regardless of which terminology is 
used, as long as it does justice to patients’ underlying 
conscious capacities, it will help clarify some of the 
misunderstandings around PDOC. The terminology 
used to define this pathway for withdrawal of CANH 
is not considered to be a definitive model and needs 
refining in some levels, but at least tries to evolve 
into one that uses both behaviour and brain imaging 
techniques to define consciousness in this complex and 
vulnerable population. Additional studies are needed 
to refine and define criteria for those categories; until 
then, this pathway could support clinicians in complex 
decision-making. Anything that could assist better 
understanding of these diagnoses is essential, in order 
to avoid a false expectancy for recovery, unnecessary 
prolongation of the patients’ lives, and emotional re­
sources, amongst others. A decision-making pathway 
that guides clinicians through this process may ease 
some of the struggles related to making such difficult 
end-of-life decisions. Although it is difficult to predict 
if CANH would lead to a quality of life that the patient 
him/herself would value, the existence of predictors 
of outcome might play a decisive role. It follows that 
developing a new taxonomy and accurate prognosis 
predictors should be a priority in the ethical decision­
making process. It would have the potential capacity 
to decisively influence the beneficent pathway towards 
the best clinical outcome for the individual.
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